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I.

INTRODUCTION: WHO BUYS THE INNOVATORS?

Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft—these are five of
the biggest companies in the global technology sector.1 These
companies define and shape the modern economy, determining
everything from how we interact with the world to how we buy
virtually everything.2 They maintain the platforms most companies
* Juris Doctor Candidate, UIC John Marshall Law School, Class of 2021.
Thank you to everyone who edited and offered their feedback on this Comment.
1. Fortune Global 500, Top 50 Global Technology Companies, FORTUNE,
www.fortune.com/global500/search/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).
2. See Dave Gershgorn & Mike Murphy, Tech Companies are Finding Big
Money
in
Smaller
Payments,
QUARTZ,
(Feb.
3,
2018),
www.qz.com/1197290/apple-amazon-google-and-microsoft-are-making-bigmoney-with-smaller-payments/ (discussing how the switch that Apple, Amazon,
Microsoft, and Google to recurring payments instead of one-time payments has
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do business on3 and the platform that most people interact on.4
These companies consistently lead the market in new technology,
including the latest phones,5 computers,6 and so on.
These companies also lead the way in purchasing other,
smaller companies.7 For example, since 2010, in the category of
Artificial Intelligence (AI) startups, Apple acquired 20 companies,
Google acquired 14, and Microsoft acquired 10.8 Acquiring these AI
startups created new products and markets for each of these
companies.9 In April 2010, Apple purchased a relatively unknown
AI speech recognition software called Siri.10 A short time later, that
technology was integrated into the company’s flagship software,
iOS.11 Today, Siri is a household name immediately connected to
Apple’s brand.12
benefited them). See also Christian de Looper, PayPal vs. Google Pay vs. Venmo
vs. Cash App vs. Apple Pay Cash, DIGITALTRENDS, (June 12, 2020),
www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/paypal-vs-google-wallet-vs-venmo-vs-squarecash/ (comparing different virtual wallets used to pay for services or transfer
cash to friends).
3. NetMarketShare, Operating System Market Share, NET MARKET SHARE,
www.netmarketshare.com/operating-system-market-share.aspx. (last visited
Oct. 11, 2019).
4. Andrew Hutchinson, Facebook Reaches 2.38 Billion Users, Beats Revenue
Estimates in Latest Update, SOCIAL MEDIA TODAY (Apr. 24, 2019), www.
socialmediatoday.com/news/facebook-reaches-238-billion-users-beats-revenueestimates-in-latest-upda/553403/.
5. Joshua Swingle, Google Pixel 4 Might Be Even More Expensive than First
Expected, PHONE ARENA (Oct. 13, 2019), www.phonearena.com/news/Google-P
ixel-4-XL-price-leak_id119618.
6. Todd Haselton, Microsoft’s New Dual-Screen Computer is the Company’s
Most Important Product in Years, CNBC (Oct. 3, 2019), www.cnbc.com/2019/10
/03/surface-neo-will-be-the-most-important-product-microsoft-launches.html.
7. See Aaron Hurst, Google Revealed to Have Acquired the Most AI Startups
Since 2009, INFORMATION AGE, (Feb. 18, 2020), www.information-age.
com/google-revealed-acquired-most-ai-startups-since-2009-123487752/ (noting
that it is estimated that the top five companies purchasing AI startups are
Google, Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, and Amazon. Id. Amazon ranked at number
five on this list bought nine companies worth an estimated $871 million. Id).
8. CB Insights, The Race for AI: Here Are the Tech Giants Rushing to Snap
Up Artificial Intelligence Startups, CB INSIGHTS (Sept. 17, 2019), www.cbinsigh
ts.com/research/top-acquirers-ai-startups-ma-timeline/.
9. Paul Sawers, How the ‘Big 5’ Bolstered Their AI Through Acquisitions in
2019, VENTUREBEAT (Dec. 23, 2019), www.venturebeat.com/2019/12/23/howthe-big-5-bolstered-their-ai-through-acquisitions-in-2019/.
10. Parmy Olson, Steve Jobs Leaves A Legacy in A.I. with Siri, FORBES (Oct.
6, 2011), www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2011/10/06/steve-jobs-leaves-a-lega
cy-in-a-i-with-siri.
11. Erick Schonefeld, Siri's IPhone App Puts a Personal Assistant in Your
Pocket, TECH CRUNCH (Feb. 4, 2010), www.techcrunch.com/2010/02/04/siriiphone-personal-assistant.
12. E.g., Liza Lin, Apple Faces $1.4 Billion Lawsuit in China in Siri Patent
Fight, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2020), www.wsj.com/articles/apple-faces-1-4-billionlawsuit-by-chinese-ai-firm-in-siri-patent-fight-11596436018
(discussing
a
patent lawsuit between Apple and a Shanghai company regarding Siri, with the
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Today, Siri is not the only virtual assistant on the market.13
Amazon’s Alexa is integrated into products such as microwaves and
rings.14 However, Alexa itself would not have been developed at all
without the purchase of Yap and Evi,15 two voice recognition
companies acquired in the early 2010s.16
In recent years, it is common to hear of big mergers and
company acquisitions like Walt Disney Company’s recent
acquisition of 21st Century Fox,17 and AT&T’s recent purchase of
Time Warner.18 These mergers happen frequently enough to make
headlines regarding the new power and influence these companies
have over our lives.19 Antitrust laws counteract this concern,
protecting competition and preventing anticompetitive practices
that may harm the economy.20
What does not get as much media coverage, however, is when
a large company buys a smaller company, like a new startup or an
established company with a niche in the marketplace.21 Apple CEO
potential consequence of preventing Apple from selling some products in
China).
13. Kate Kozuch, Alexa vs. Google Assistant vs. Siri: Which Smart Assistant
is Best?, TOM’S GUIDE (July 14, 2020) www.tomsguide.com/us/alexa-vs-siri-vsgoogle,review-4772.html.
14. Cameron Faulkner, The Biggest Announcements from Amazon’s Fall
2019
Hardware
Event,
VERGE
(Sept.
25,
2019),
www.theverge.com/2019/9/25/20881736/amazon-event-news-productsannouncements-updates-highlights-alexa-echo.
15. Joshua Brustein, The Real Story of How Amazon Built the Echo,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 19, 2016), www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-amazon-echo/.
16. Arjun Kharpal, Why US Tech Giants are Buying British AI Start-ups,
CNBC (Feb. 5, 2016), www.cnbc.com/2016/02/05/why-us-tech-giants-arebuying-british-ai-start-ups.html; Matt Weinberger, How Amazon's Echo Went
from a Smart Speaker to the Center of Your Home, BUS. INSIDER (May 23, 2017),
www.businessinsider.com/amazon-echo-and-alexa-history-from-speaker-tosmart-home-hub-2017-5.
17. Matthew Schwartz, Disney Officially Owns 21st Century Fox, NPR (Mar.
20, 2019), www.npr.org/2019/03/20/705009029/disney-officially-owns-21stcentu
ry-fox.
18. See Dawn Chmielewski, AT&T Completes $85B Acquisition of Time
Warner, DEADLINE (June 14, 2018), www.deadline.com/2018/06/att-completestime-warner-acquisition-1202411103/ (describing the merger of AT&T and
Time Warner, and the history of the merger).
19. Kif Leswing, The iPhone Decade: How Apple’s Phone Created and
Destroyed Industries and Changed the World, CNBC (Dec. 16, 2019),
www.cnbc.com/2019/12/16/apples-iphone-created-industries-and-changed-theworld-this-decade.html. The article discusses how Apple has altered the way
people interact with the world, using a smartphone to essentially replace things
such as a camera or a flashlight. Id. The iPhone shaped and continues to shape
markets, making Apple one of the most successful and profitable companies in
the world. Id.
20. Guide to Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE. COMM’N, www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws (last visited Nov. 26, 2019).
21. Cf. Adam Satariano, Google Faces European Inquiry Into Fitbit
Acquisition, NY TIMES (Aug. 4, 2020), www.nytimes.com/2020/08/04/busin

676

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:461

Tim Cook revealed that in six months in 2019, “Apple has bought
approximately 20 to 25 companies.”22 As Cook explained, “Apple
often doesn’t announce these deals because the companies are
small, and Apple is ‘primarily looking for talent and intellectual
property.’”23
The public tends to look at the larger companies and question
how antitrust policies allow this to happen, focusing on the large
market power of the resultant company.24 This focus on the larger
mergers at times overshadows the purchasing of smaller companies
and startups.25 These smaller purchases allow these larger
corporate entities to dominate a market in its infancy, before the
newer startups have a chance to compete.26 Current regulation
places a significant weight on consumer welfare, along with
preventing market over-centralization and other traditional factors
to analyze current antitrust issues; but this approach may not be
sufficient to address market centralization of new and smaller
startups or businesses.27 Many purchases of startups may be
innocuous, such as based on adding new talent, but can lead to
market dominance and over-centralization if left unchecked.28
Current antitrust regulation may not be equipped to handle when
large companies buy up smaller startups. Existing regulations may
also not be enough to ensure that these purchases are not leading
to anticompetitive behavior.29
ess/google-fitbit-europe.html (discussing Google facing an investigation for its
purchase of Fitbit, which is Google buying an established company).
22. See Lauren Feiner, Apple Buys a Company Every Few Weeks, Says CEO
Tim Cook, CNBC (May 6, 2019), www.cnbc.com/2019/05/06/apple-buys-a-comp
any-every-few-weeks-says-ceo-tim-cook.html (discussing comments made from
Apple CEO Tim Cook regarding Apple’s acquisition strategy).
23. Id.
24. See Nialy Patel, The Court’s Decision to Let AT&T and Time Warner
Merge is Ridiculously Bad, VERGE (June 15, 2018) www.theverge.com/201
8/6/15/17468612/att-time-warner-acquisition-court-decision (analyzing the
decision by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to allow the
AT&T and Time Warner merger to go through and analyzing the decision and
the potential future effects of the decision).
25. E.g. CB Insights, supra note 8 (describing major companies purchases of
startup artificial intelligence companies to integrate into their own company’s
research and development).
26. Id.
27. See Hurst, supra note 7 (illustrating that startups in the AI field are
being purchased in mass by a few larger companies).
28. See Sawers, supra note 9 (noting that Facebook bought a visual search
company GrokStyle and closed it to integrate its technology or staff.) See also
Schonefeld, supra note 11 (covering Apple buying Siri, a formerly independent
startup and integrating it, rather than starting their own competitor).
29. E.g., Diane Bartz and Nandita Bose, FTC Demands Data on Small Buys
by Google, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, REUTERS (Feb. 11, 2020),
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tech-antitrust/ftc-demands-data-on-smallbuys-by-google-amazon-apple-facebook-microsoft-idUSKBN205261 (discussing
that the FTC has begun investigating mergers that were too small to report).
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This Comment explores how antitrust regulations are not
adequate to protect the market from the risks inherent in these
smaller purchases. In Part II, this Comment will first define and
explain the history of U.S. Antitrust law and its current state. In
Part III, this Comment will next analyze how Antitrust regulations
are enforced against large companies, specifically as to how large
firms have been regulated under current law. In Part IV, this
Comment will propose how the same current Antitrust law could be
better applied to prevent anticompetitive purchases of startups.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Definitions and Theory
Antitrust laws, in general, protect competition.30 The goal is to
protect consumers, ensuring low prices and competition.31 The
government tries to intervene when companies in the marketplace
generally begin acting in a way that is not beneficial to the
consumers, termed as anticompetitive acts.32 These acts can range
from the companies “raising prices, or to divide business” among
themselves, but generally Antitrust laws only cover acts that harm
consumers.33 Harm to consumers can occur in various ways,
starting with the threat of higher prices, to the deprivation of new
products, and more.34 Over time, many competing theories battled
for dominance, each competing to be the best way to enforce these
antitrust policies.

B. Historical Developments
The theories on how to best enforce Antitrust law have shifted
throughout history, especially after the New Deal era. During this
time, applying economic theory to antitrust issues became a
predominant way to analyze potential anticompetitive behavior,
rather than solely based on political interests.35 The post-New Deal
approach to antitrust law combined economic insights with the
more policy-based goals.36 The economists set standards for
measuring the degree of concentration in a market, impact on
competition, and barriers to entry, basing policy off of data.37 The
30. Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer, DEP’T JUSTICE (Dec. 18, 2015)
www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-enforcement-and-consumer.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (2D ED. 1968).
36. Id.
37. Id.
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“Chicago School,” an approach centered on efficiency and consumer
welfare, gained traction and changed the focus to how the activity
would affect the consumer.38 After the Chicago School’s approach
rose in popularity, the Post-Chicago School emerged, focusing on
how predatory behavior may stifle competition, while incorporating
some of the Chicago School’s approaches.39
1. Post-New Deal Approach
Between the 1930s and 1960s, the field of antitrust economics
was dominated by scholars, largely based out of Harvard.40 Instead
of regulating due to pressure from politicians, antitrust laws were
enforced using data to measure how concentrated the market was.41
This approach incorporated “market concentration, presence,
height, and durability of entry barriers, and the measurement of
each of those factors on competition.”42 Using economics to
determine market concentration was often paired with a belief that
“real competition requires a market structure with a significant
amount of competitors.”43 Typical analysis uses economic indicators
such as the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure the
concentration of an industry.44 HHI serves as an indicator that is
understandable enough, as the higher the HHI, the more the
market is dominated by a single firm.45
However, sometimes standard economic indicators on their
own may not be enough to determine if a market participant is
acting anticompetitively.46 Markets can be susceptible to
anticompetitive practices that could lead to monopolistic behavior.47
Currently, big companies purchase some small startups in ways

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. C. PAUL RODGERS III, STEPHEN CALKINGS, MARK R. PATTERSON &
WILLIAM R. ANDERSON, ANTITRUST LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 24 (4th ed.
2008).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing William Shepherd, Economic Analysis to Guide Antitrust, 35
NYL. SCH. L. REV. 917, 919-20 (1990)).
44. See Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, DEP’T JUSTICE, www.justice.gov/at
r/herfindahl-hirschman-index (last visited Nov. 26, 2019) (explaining basics of
HHI and generally when they consider a market to be concentrated, with 2,500
points being the threshold for being highly concentrated).
45. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, DEP’T JUSTICE, www.justice.gov/atr
/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010#5c (last visited Nov. 26, 2019).
46. See Diane Bartz and Nandita Bose, supra note 29 (discussing how
certain mergers and acquisitions fell below the reporting requirements whose
potential anticompetitive effects may not be noticed).
47. Brianna S. Hills, When Cheating is Good and Cooperation is Bad:
Conspiracies and the Continuing Violations Doctrine Under the Sherman Act,
83 MO. L. REV. 195, 197 (2018).
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that, according to current guidelines, do not require further
investigation.48 Purchases may not raise barriers to entry
immediately, but in the long run gives an established company
advantages over future entrants.49 Any new entrants have larger
hurdles to cross in order to compete, while the larger company may
have a commanding position in the market.50
2. The Chicago School
This approach arose at the University of Chicago in the late
1960s, focusing more on the “formal tools of microeconomic
analysis.”51 The primary approach focused on an economic efficiency
theory, in that, generally, efficient companies are by nature
larger.”52 Their size allows them to underbid rivals to achieve their
larger market share, to the benefit of the consumer.53
When this happens, large companies that underbid rivals
“cannot retain a large share except by maintaining superior
efficiency, so the company earns not monopoly profits, but only
economic rent.”54 This approach favors companies underbidding in
the marketplace, allowing them to gain a larger share of the
market, leading to a more efficient market.55 However, the Chicago
School approach has led to less enforcement of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts.56
3. Post-Chicago School Approaches
The Post-Chicago school approaches were developed in
response to the acceptance of the Chicago School’s approach to
48. Contra Midwestern Mach. Co. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 392 F.3d 265, 271
(8th Cir. 2004) (holding that price increases after a merger was not an overt act,
but a “inertial consequence of the merger”).
49. Jason Furman, Beyond Antitrust: The Role of Competition Policy in
Promoting Inclusive Growth (Sep. 16, 2016), www.obamawhitehouse.archives
.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160916_searle_conference_competition_fur
man_cea.pdf; see also Eliot G. Disner, Barrier Analysis in Antitrust Law, 58
CORNELL L. REV. 862, 897 (1973) (finding that “large size gives a firm the
leverage to price in a manner that discourages entry”).
50. Disner, supra note 49, at 897.
51. RODGERS, supra note 40, at 24.
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing William Shepherd, Economic Analysis to Guide Antitrust, 35
NYL. SCH. L. REV. 917, 919-20 (1990)).
54. Rodgers, supra note 40, at 25.
55. Id.
56. Maurice Stucke et al., The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the U.S. Antitrust
Movement, HBR (Dec 15, 2017), www.hbr.org/2017/12/the-rise-fall-and-rebirthof-the-u-s-antitrust-movement (covering the changes in the antitrust
enforcement field); see also Division Operations, DEP’T JUSTICE,
www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations (last visited Nov. 26, 2019) (showing
the agency’s own record workload has decreased since the 1970s).
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antitrust law and regulations.57 Modern approaches focus on
incorporating the improvements in analysis from the Chicago
School with a framework that focuses on predatory behavior and its
harm to competition.58 This was done specifically without expressly
overturning the developments of the Chicago School and
incorporating the underlying beliefs into a different framework.59
This approach attempts to bridge the gap between the Chicago
School and a more traditional view, focusing on preventing large
companies’ anticompetitive practices more structurally.60 Still,
these policies focus on the larger, anticompetitive actions from
larger companies.61
The Chicago School’s focus on larger mergers has been directly
challenged in recent years.62 In 2017, the article Amazon’s Antitrust
Paradox was published in the Yale Law Journal by Lina Khan.63
This article pushed back on the idea that antitrust should focus on
consumer welfare and focus more on competitive balance.64
This Comment discusses the apparent failures of the Chicago
School approach, in that consumer interest are not just the cost of
the product.65 This new focus shifts the discussion away from just
consumer welfare and back towards protecting competitive markets
as another facet of antitrust policy that should be protected.66 This
specific Post-Chicago School approach focused on the history beyond
just consumer welfare, referencing back to the Act’s legislative
history focusing on benefiting open markets.67

C. History
United States antitrust law began developing in earnest in the
late 19th century as a reaction to fundamental shifts in industry

57. Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy as a Political Bargain, 73
ANTITRUST L.J., 483, 512-15 (2006).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 925, 933 (1979).
62. Stucke et al., supra note 56
63. Lina M. Khan, Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710 (2017).
David Streitfeld, Amazon’s Antitrust Antagonist Has a Breakthrough Idea, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/technology/monopolyantitrust-lina-khan-amazon.html.
64. See generally Id. (discusses how consumers may benefit from low prices,
but there are other anticompetitive acts at play). Additionally, Streitfeld
mentions the pushback from others in the field in response to the article, and
that it “open[s] up a much needed debate.” Id.
65. Khan, supra note 63, at 737.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 743.

2021]

Current Regulations Toward Monopolization

681

and commerce.68
As railroads spread across the nation,
transporting goods and people became easier.69 As a result, overall
freight costs decreased for shipping goods nationwide.70 At the same
time, railroad companies began to organize and set prices, deciding
to charge more than they would have otherwise, which is a practice
is called price fixing.71 Price fixing occurs when nominal competitors
in a market, like the railroads in the 19th century, agree to set
prices – typically in secret.72 When competing companies in the
same market decide to restrict competition by fixing prices, the end
result is usually higher costs for the consumer.73
Antitrust laws have been designed to protect the marketplace
from anticompetitive acts.74 Price fixing was an early
anticompetitive concern addressed by antitrust regulators.75
Companies could together charge a higher price for their product,
however, “not all price similarities . . . are the result of price
fixing.”76 Common products may have similarities in price,
68. Laura Phillips Sawyer, US Antitrust Law and Policy in Historical
Perspective, (Harvard Business School, Working Paper 19–110, 2019) (citing
NAOMI LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS,
1895–1904 (1985)).
69. See Wayne Collins, Trusts and the Origins of Antitrust Legislation, 81
FORDHAM L.R. 2279, 2282-83 (2013). Finding that among the many changes in
the economy during this time period, the average cost of freight decreased over
90 percent in 50 years. Id. at 2283. More telegraph lines, more of energy being
consumed and produced, and new manufacturing innovations are just some of
the many changes that led to larger businesses. Id. at 2286.
70 U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n., 166 U.S. 290, 312 (1897). The
Supreme Court found that any “agreement of such a nature does restrain
[trade], the agreement is condemned by [The Sherman Act].” Id. The companies
in question entered into an association to set rail prices across the country and
agree to not compete against each other. Id. at 331.
71. See also U.S. v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 564 (1898) (discussing
the agreement being in secret and to prevent competition between nominal
competitors in a marketplace).
72. Compare U.S. v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 576 (1898)
(determining that the agreement was designed to keep prices higher), with
Anderson v. U.S., 171 U.S. 604, 614 (1898) (finding that the agreement “ha[d]
nothing whatever to do with transportation nor with fixing the prices for which
the cattle may be purchased or thereafter sold”).
73. E.g., Price Fixing, FED. TRADE. COMM’N, www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/comp
etition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/dealings-competitors/price-fixing
(last
visited Oct. 13, 2019) (“Price fixing is an agreement (written, verbal, or inferred
from conduct) among competitors that raises, lowers, or stabilizes prices or
competitive terms”).
74. Guide to Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE. COMM’N, ftc.gov/tips-advice/com
petition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws (last visited Nov. 24, 2019).
75. Swift & Co. v. U.S., 196 U.S. 375, 394 (1905) (“To sum up the bill more
shortly, it charges a combination of a dominant proportion of the dealers in fresh
meat throughout the United States not to bid against each other in the live stock
markets of the different States . . . to fix prices at which they will sell …”).
76. See id., for the specific example, as common goods with identical prices
like commodities such as wheat may have similar market prices that are not
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especially when the products are identical, such as wheat, because
each individual product is similar to each other.77 While the price
may be the same, it is not because of anticompetitive practices – it
is because the underlying product is the same.78
Early antitrust law focused not just on price fixing but on a
broad swath of anticompetitive practices in the economy.79
Generally, antitrust regulation is designed so that the agencies
tasked with enforcement can “protect American consumers and
promote competition.”80 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. U.S. is a
case that defined the antitrust movement.81 There, the Supreme
Court found that Standard Oil attempted to exclude other
companies from the market by restraining trade to monopolize the
oil industry.82 A monopoly is when a single firm has an exclusive
hold over the market.83 This landmark case found that the recently
enacted Sherman Act was designed “to protect, not to destroy, rights
of property.”84 The Supreme Court enforced the Sherman Act in this
instance by forcing the breakup of Standard Oil into 34 separate
companies.85 Eventually, many of these companies did merge again
into one corporate entity.86 After the dissolution of the monopoly, no
the result of price fixing.
77. See Fed. Trade. Comm’n, Fiscal Year 2018 Agency Financial Report (Nov
13, 2018), www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/agency-financial-reportfy2018/ftc_agency_financial_report_fy2018_1.pdf (reiterating the FTC’s
mandate under the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914).
78. Id.
79. See Northern Securities Co. v. U.S., 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (discussing a
railroad merger that the federal government determined was designed to
prevent competition, and that determination was approved by the Supreme
Court).
80. Fed. Trade. Comm’n, supra note 77.
81. Standard Oil Co. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
82. Id. at 75 (“prima facie presumption of intent to restrain trade, to
monopolize and to bring about monopolization . . . vesting it with such vast
control of the oil industry, is made conclusive”).
83. Monopolization Defined, FED. TRADE. COMM’N, www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firmconduct/monopolization-defined (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (“The antitrust laws
prohibit conduct by a single firm that unreasonably restrains competition by
creating or maintaining monopoly power . . . Section 2 of the Sherman Act also
bans attempts to monopolize and conspiracies to monopolize”).
84. See id. at 78, for a description of what the Sherman Act is intending to
protect, consumers and the “fact must not be overlooked that injury to the public
by the prevention of an undue restraint on, or the monopolization of trade.” Id.
85. John J. Flynn, Standard Oil and Microsoft - Intriguing Parallels or
Limping Analogies, 46 ANTITRUST BULL. 645, 646 (2001).
86. See Exxon-Mobil Merger Done, CNN MONEY (Nov. 30, 1999),
www.money.cnn. com/1999/11/30/deals/exxonmobil/ (remarking that the new
corporation would be the “biggest of the three ‘supermajors,’” the largest oil
company in the world). The approval for the merger was a 4-0 vote by the FTC.
Id. See also Jeff Desjardins, Chart: The Evolution of Standard Oil, VISUAL
CAPITALIST (Nov. 24, 2017), www.visualcapitalist.com/chart-evolutionstandard-oil/ (charting the track of mergers and acquisitions of the entities
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oil company dominates the market the same way that Standard Oil
did.87 Currently, the U.S. oil market has various companies that
supply the domestic market, with no company dominating as much
as Standard Oil did historically.88
1. Enforcement Agencies
Two main federal agencies are and have been responsible for
federal antitrust enforcement: The Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division
(Antitrust Division).89
a. Department of Justice Antitrust Division
The Antitrust Division at the Department of Justice was
officially organized in 1919, but antitrust enforcement has been
funded by Congress since 1903.90 The main characteristic that
defines the Antitrust Division is the ability to bring criminal
penalties under Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.91 The Antitrust
Division can bring penalties up to ten years in prison or a 1 million
dollar fine for an individual.92 Corporations can also be fined up to
100 million dollars for violations.93
The Antitrust Division’s main focus in enforcement actions has
been towards enforcing against cartels and their actions.94
Anticompetitive actions by cartels are obvious and easy to spot with
a straightforward remedy that can be implemented quickly.95 The
Antitrust Division has the discretion to decide what actions to bring
and whether an action should be brought against a company.96
formed after the dissolution of Standard Oil).
87. Compare Oil: Crude and Petroleum Products Explained, U.S. ENERGY
INFO.ADMIN. (Apr. 24, 2019), www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleumproducts/where-our-oil-comes-from.php (reporting that the U.S. receives oil
from many different locations) with Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin
Klein, Monopolization by Raising Rivals Costs: The Standard Oil Case,
39 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1996) (finding that Standard Oil’s share of the refining
market was more than 90 percent of the market in 1879).
88. Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin Klein, supra note 87, at 2.
89. William Blumenthal, Models for Merging the US Antitrust Agencies, 1 J.
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 24, 25 (2013).
90. Id. at 24.
91. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2019).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2019).
93. Id.
94. Thomas O. Barnett, Seven Steps to Better Cartel Enforcement, DEP’T
JUSTICE (June 2, 2006), www.justice.gov/atr/speech/seven-steps-better-cartelenforcement.
95. Id.
96. See RODGERS, supra note 40, at 36 (citing Donald Baker, To Indicate Not
to Indict: Prosecutorial Discretion in Sherman Act Enforcement, 63 CORNELL L.
REV. 405 (1978)) (remarking that enforcement of the acts is left up to the
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b. Federal Trade Commission
The FTC has jurisdiction under the Clayton Act to investigate
antitrust issues.97 The FTC also has exclusive authority to enforce
the Federal Trade Commission Act.98 Historically, the FTC has had
the ability to enforce beyond the Sherman and Claytons Acts
provisions, allowing the FTC to determine “unfair methods of
competition” themselves as time passed.99 In modern times, courts
have shifted to restrict the FTC to what was defined explicitly under
the Clayton and Sherman Acts.100 These restrictions prevent the
FTC from investigating and bringing enforcement actions against
actions that do not clearly violate the antitrust principles outlined
in the Acts.101 This serves as a limitation preventing the FTC from
enforcing against actions that may be seen as normal commercial
behavior.102
2. Antitrust Acts
While the Sherman Act intends “to protect the public from the
failure of the market,”103 it is not the only regulation and law
preventing anti-competitive practices. There are three antitrust
laws that have been the cornerstones of antitrust law: the Sherman
Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Clayton Act.104
The Supreme Court in Standard Oil set forth the first standard
for deciding when a company has monopoly power—when the
“nature and character of the dealing” is enough to show
monopolistic behavior based off of the Sherman Act.105 The
Sherman Act itself was based on previous principles in common law

discretion of the agencies themselves, and that they do not need to be compelled
to act).
97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2019).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2019).
99. F.T.C. v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 310 (1934) (finding that
Congress did not intend to restrict the “forbidden acts” that the FTC was
attempting to regulate to a few predefined categories). The FTC was able to
determine if a new action was unfair or anticompetitive and had the ability to
make their own determinations. Id. at 314.
100. E.I. du Pont de Nemoirs & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 1984).
101. Id.
102. Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980).
103. Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993).
104. The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE. COMM’N, www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust laws (last visited
Aug. 14, 2020).
105. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 54 (finding that when the “freedom of the
individual to deal was restricted,” that was one of many indicators of
monopolistic behavior).
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and updated for the issues of the day.106 In a broad sense, the
Sherman Act covers any attempt of monopolization or a “restraint
of trade.”107 Considering the intention of the Sherman Act, “the
words ‘to monopolize’ and ‘monopolize’ as used in the [Act] reach
every act bringing about the prohibited results.”108
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was created in 1914,109
along with the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914.110 The FTC was
empowered to broadly prevent unfair competition, create
regulation, investigate and seek restitution for unfair or deceptive
practices.111 The Clayton Act expanded the scope of the Sherman
Act, covering anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions; and the
goal was to prevent certain anticompetitive acts before they
happened, giving the FTC and the Department of Justice authority
to regulate mergers.112 Regulating mergers before they occurred
prevented companies exploiting a loophole in the Sherman Act, by
merging into one entity.113 The Clayton Act was amended multiple
times,114 as the intent was to remedy these loopholes in the Act ,115
and cover other types of mergers.116 The changes to the Clayton Act
were designed to prevent companies from utilizing the loophole by
purchasing the company differently, and to promote competition.117
Mergers are now generally seen as falling within the enforcement
agencies’ ability to regulate and prevent because of these acts.118

106. See also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 498 (1940) (finding
that “having those effects on the competitive system and on purchasers and
consumers of goods or services which were characteristic of restraints deemed
illegal at common law”).
107. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 61.
108. C.f., Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 459 (determining that “the conduct
of a single firm [is] unlawful only when it actually monopolizes or dangerously
threatens to do so”) In enforcing the Sherman Act, there needs to be a serious
risk of monopolization, but if that initial showing is met, then they may be found
liable for anticompetitive practices. Id.
109. 15 U.S.C. §§ 47-58 (2019).
110. Id. at §§ 12-27 (2019).
111. Id. at § 57(a) (2019).
112. Id. at § 18(a) (2019).
113. Id.
114. E.g. Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962) (concluding that
the purpose was to “plug the loophole" exempting asset acquisitions from
coverage under the [Clayton] Act).
115. See U.S. v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 276 (1966) (noting that the
amendments to the act were attempting to prevent consolidation through
mergers).
116. U.S. v. Cont’l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 449 (1964) (determining that
vertical and conglomerate mergers may be “deserving of [Clayton Act] § 7
protection and therefore the basis for defining a relevant product market”).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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D. Antitrust Remedies
There are two broad categories of antitrust remedies—
structural remedies and conduct remedies.119 In terms of merger
cases, structural remedies are favored “because they are relatively
clean and certain, and generally avoid costly government
entanglement in the market.”120 Structural remedies are “’simple,
relatively easy to administer, and sure to preserve competition.”121
In terms of mergers, conduct remedies are appropriate when the
remedies can help the structural solution or if the structural remedy
is inefficient.122
1. Structural Remedies
Structural remedies are designed to protect competition by
requiring the sale, or a divestiture, of part of a company.123 These
remedies focus on making sure that the separated parts are both
competitively viable.124 In an ideal world, the goal is to separate an
isolated entity that can be viable on its own.125 Establishing a
separate firm may be difficult if there is a forced relationship,
leaving the new firm tied to the actions of the original firm.126 There
may be an agreement to ensure the viability of the separated assets
during the transition.127 However, “the continued interaction

119. Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, DEP’T JUSTICE
(Oct. 2004), www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2011/06/16/205108.pd
f [hereinafter DOJ Antitrust Policy 2004].
120. Id.
121. Id. (citing U.S. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 331
(1961)) (concluding that “in Government actions divestiture is the preferred
remedy for an illegal merger or acquisition”).
122. See id. (stating that preventing the merger would “sacrifice significant
efficiencies and a structural remedy would similarly eliminate such efficiencies
or is simply infeasible”).
123. See RONAN P HARTY & NATHAN KIRATZIS, MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE
50 (2nd ed. Oct. 2019) [hereinafter MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE] (citing DOJ
Antitrust Policy 2004, supra note 119) (remarking that the Antitrust Division
found that “structural remedies generally will involve the sale of physical assets
by merging firms”).
124. See MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 123. (seeking to “ensure that
the divested assets are likely to be used to preserve competition”).
125. See, Frequently Asked Questions About Merger Consent Order
Provisions, FED. TRADE. COMM’N, www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidanc
e/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers/merger-faq# (last visited Jan. 4, 2020) (finding
“[t]he divestiture of an intact, on-going business generally assures that the
buyer of such a package will be able to operate and compete in the relevant
market immediately”).
126. MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 123, at 56.
127. Id. at 57 (“The exact nature of any transition services agreement
depends on the specific needs of the divestiture buyer in regards to competing
with the divestiture package”).
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between these competitors raises the risk of improper coordination,”
so enforcement agencies take the duration of the agreement into
account.128 Overall, structural remedies focus on separating the
company to ensure the new firm or assets are independent and
sufficient in the marketplace.129
2. Conduct Remedies
The other category of remedies are not based on the structure
of the firm but on the firm’s conduct.130 These remedies are also
sometimes used alongside structural remedies like divestiture.131
These conduct remedies have swung in terms of which remedies are
favored in merger situations.132 Currently, there is a preference by
the enforcement agencies for structural remedies.133 Under those
standards, a conduct remedy would usually be “injunctive
provisions that would, in effect, manage or regulate the merged
firm’s post-merger business conduct.”134 The current trend disfavors
conduct remedies, focusing on divestiture as the primary way to
discourage and resolve anticompetitive acts and practices.135
There are many different conduct remedies available that can
address different anticompetitive acts and issues at play.136 A
firewall provision restricts information flows in the case of a
merger, “preventing improper information sharing between

128. Id. at 56.
129. See id. (noting that “[f]or structural remedies . . . agencies evaluate
many factors, including the sufficiency of divested assets, the adequacy of the
divestiture buyer and the actual mechanics of the divestiture”).
130. Report on The FTC’s Merger Remedies 2006–2012, at 18–19, FED.
TRADE. COMM’N (Jan. 2017), www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/ftcsmerger-remedies-2006-2012-report-bureaus-competition-economics/p143100_ft
c_merger_remedies_2006-2012.pdf.
131. MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 123, at 58.
132. See Makan Delrahim, It Takes Two: Modernizing the Merger Review
Process, Remarks at the 2018 Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium, DEP’T
JUSTICE (Sept. 25, 2018), www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorneygeneral-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-2018-global-antitrust (exemplifying
this swing in which remedies are favored, with the 2011 policy being replaced
in 2018 with the 2004 policy).
133. See id. (noting that the most 2011 guidelines are now historical and are
replaced by the 2004 standards). See also Merger Enforcement, DEP’T JUSTICE
(Jul. 30, 2019), www.justice.gov/atr/merger-enforcement (explaining that the
2004 standards are the guidelines the Antitrust Division uses, and the 2011
standards are historical).
134. DOJ Antitrust Policy 2004, supra note 119.
135. See MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 123, at 59 (noting that “both
antitrust agencies have demonstrated a strong (and growing) trend of
disfavouring the use of conduct remedies to resolve competitive concerns”).
136. Id. at 60. (“include[es] internal firewalls, external remedies, hybrid
remedies, third-party consents and approvals, and agency monitoring and
reporting requirements”).
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competitors and anticompetitive conduct.”137 This provision would
“minimize[] the risk that the integrated firm will use information to
disadvantage a rival competitor.”138 Another remedy is a mandatory
licensing program, requiring certain technology or intellectual
property to be licensed to others.139 Mandatory licensing helps
ensure that intellectual property used for research and
development can still be accessed by other parties.140 Fair dealing
provisions prevent firms from disadvantaging others by “ensur[ing]
that equal access, efforts and terms are available to those who
contract with the transacting parties.”141 Two other related
provisions that the regulatory agencies use are prior notification
and prior approval provisions.142 Overall, these provisions require
that merging companies notify the regulatory agency if they
attempt to merge in the market that the provision is related to or,
alternatively, gain the approval altogether.143 The regulatory
agencies may decide to prohibit restrictive contracting practices
from the merged entity through exclusive dealing contracts.144 An
example is the restrictions on Microsoft’s licenses in the final
consent decree in U.S. v. Microsoft.145 Another conduct remedy is
an anti-retaliation provision, “prevent[ing] the merged entity from
unreasonably restricting competition”.146 These provisions prevent
the firm “from retaliating against customers who conduct business
. . . with its competitors.147 Overall, these remedies can be difficult
to draft, but balance “the procompetitive benefits of a transaction
while protecting against the risk of potential competitive harm.”148

III. ANALYSIS
First, this section will examine the benefits and failures of both
structure and conduct remedies in the landmark antitrust case U.S.
137. Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, DEP’T JUSTICE
(Jun. 2011) [hereinafter DOJ Antitrust Policy 2011]; Richard Feinstein,
Director, Bureau of Competition, Negotiating Merger Remedies: Statement of
the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission (Jan. 2012).
138. Id.
139. DOJ Antitrust Policy 2011, supra note 137, at 15–16; Feinstein, supra
note 137, at 897.
140. MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 123, at 60.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 64.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 61.
145. E.g., U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
[hereinafter Microsoft III] (discussing the licenses “prohibit[ing] OEMs from
modifying the initial boot sequence--the process that occurs the first time a
consumer turns on the computer”).
146. MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 123, at 62.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 66.
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v. Microsoft Corp. Next, this section will analyze the potential
failures of common antitrust remedies used by the enforcement
agencies. Lastly, this section will evaluate current policy used by
the enforcement agencies.

A. U.S. v. Microsoft Corporation.
U.S. v. Microsoft Corp. is a case that redefined antitrust
regulation.149 During the 1990’s, the FTC began investigating
Microsoft over concerns that the company was using its power in
the operating system market to dominate in the software
development market.150 This inquiry reportedly was initially
covering whether IBM and Microsoft were restricting Windows’
acceptance as an operating system in favor of an operating system
that was developed jointly.151 However, other members of the
software industry believed that Microsoft was acting
uncompetitively and hoped that the FTC investigation would bring
to light or address their concerns.152 As the operating system and
modern computing industries were in their relative infancy,
Microsoft’s early dominance and actions were concerning.153
This ended up being the focus of the FTC investigation:
Microsoft’s potentially anticompetitive acts in the operating
systems market as a whole.154 The FTC began investigating
whether “[Microsoft] unfairly monopolized the software market,” a
very broad investigation covering Microsoft’s business practices as
a whole.155 At the time, Microsoft sold “[about] 85 percent of the
personal computer operating software . . . in the world,” becoming
almost a singular force in the operating systems market.156
After three years of investigating, the FTC staff voted and
could not reach a consensus on whether to take legal action to stop
certain market practices of Microsoft.”157 After deadlocking twice,
149. Microsoft III, 253 F.3d 34.
150. Lawrence M. Fisher, Microsoft in Inquiry by F.T.C., N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
13, 1991), www.nytimes.com/1991/03/13/business/microsoft-in-inquiry-by-ftc.ht
ml.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. (“Competing software companies have a long list of complaints
about Microsoft, ranging from announcements of nonexistent products that
promise features matching or beating the competition to using the list of
Windows customers for a direct-mail campaign to sell applications programs”).
154. Evelyn Richards and Mark Potts, FTC Expands Microsoft Probe, WASH.
POST
(Apr.
13,
1991),
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/busin
ess/1991/04/13/ftc-expands-microsoft-probe/ee95b8b7-a794-43b5-982d748bc4c75f91/.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. John Burgess, FTC Deadlocks Again in Microsoft Investigation, WASH.
POST
(Jul.
22,
1993),
www.washingtonpost.com/ar

690

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:461

the FTC decided to close their investigation.158 From there, the
Antitrust Division began their investigation, “using FTC's
extensive investigatory file as its starting point.”159 The Antitrust
Division’s investigation had the potential to protect smaller
companies, without falling into the pitfalls of a structural
remedy.160
1. Previous Related Antitrust Actions Before U.S. v.
Microsoft Corp.
Structural relief and remedies are "designed to eliminate the
monopoly altogether.”161 Structural remedies attempt to resolve the
antitrust issue by changing the structure of the firm itself.162
Previous antitrust lawsuits against IBM and AT&T focused on
structural remedies and took up a significant amount of time and
resources for the Antitrust Division.163 The case against AT&T was
filed in 1974 and took eight years before a consent agreement was
reached.164 AT&T had previously been operating with a consent
agreement made in 1956, with litigation beginning in January
1949.165 In January 1969, the Antitrust Division brought a suit
against IBM.166 That case took almost exactly thirteen years until
the Antitrust Division agreed to dismiss the case.167 The Antitrust
Division chose not to pursue a structural remedy to split up the
company, rather attempted to change the company’s practices.168

chive/business/1993/07/22/ftc-deadlocks-again-in-microsoftinvestigation/dd8ce8ed-1d66-4c32-b5af-6334f422e364/. (“Industry sources said
that [the July 21, 1993] deliberations focused on the $1 billion-plus market for
operating systems”).
158. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1451 (1995).
159. Id.
160. Wendy Goldman, Oh No, Mr. Bill!, WIRED (Apr. 1, 1994), www.wired.co
m/1994/04/gates-6/.
161. Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 106 (citing AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION (3rd ed. 1995)).
162. DOJ Antitrust Policy 2004, supra note 119, at 7.
163. Goldman, supra note 160.
164. U.S. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 139-41 (D.D.C.
1982).
165. Id. at 136. The initial complaint by the Antitrust Division sought “the
divestiture by AT&T of its stock ownership in Western Electric; termination of
exclusive relationships between AT&T and Western Electric, [etc.].”
166. U.S. vs. I.B.M., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 1981), www.nytimes.com/1981/
02/15/business/us-vsibm.html.
167. U.S. v. Int’; Bus. Mach. Corp., 539 F. Supp. 473, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Lilliane Kerjan, Antitrust Laws: The IBM and AT&T Cases, 35 REVUE
FRANÇAISE D'ÉTUDES AMÉRICAINES EDITIONS BELIN 89, 96 (Feb. 1988)
(“whereas has concluded that the case is without merit and should be . . .
without costs to either side”).
168. See Goldman, supra note 160 (stating that “focusing on relief through
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2. Microsoft’s Consent Decree
Eventually, Microsoft agreed to the consent agreement which
was offered when the suit was filed.169 The consent decree
prohibited Microsoft from engaging in certain anticompetitive acts,
both those currently in practice and any future acts.170 This is an
example of a behavioral or conduct remedy – attempting to change
the behavior of a company by restricting what it can engage in.171
Later in the decade, the Antitrust Division filed suit against
Microsoft again over concerns that it was about to violate the
consent decree.172 Microsoft was planning on requiring distributors
of the latest edition of its Windows operating system to include
Microsoft’s Internet Explorer web browser in the installation of
Windows.173 A preliminary injunction against Microsoft was
entered, preventing it from requiring the preinstallation of Internet
Explorer.174 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding
that Microsoft showed the “plausible benefits to its integrated
design” of integrating Internet Explorer.175 The plausible benefits
were the benefits that may be provided to the consumer.176
very specific changes in the company's software licensing policies and other
business practices [is] deemed to be anti-competitive”).
169. Amy Harmon, News Analysis: Gates Dealt a Humbling, but Instructive,
Blow, L. A. TIMES (Jul. 17, 1994), www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-0717-mn-16804-story.html.
170. See Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1452 (explaining that “prohibits Microsoft
from entering into per processor licenses, licenses with a term exceeding one
year (unless the customer opts to renew for another year), licenses containing a
minimum commitment, and unduly restrictive nondisclosure agreements). To
prevent Microsoft from using other exclusionary practices to achieve effects
similar to those achieved by the practices challenged in the complaint, the
proposed decree also prohibits certain other arrangements such as lump-sum
pricing and variants of per processor licensing.” Id.
171. MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 123, at 2, (citing Report on The
FTC’s Merger Remedies 2006–2012, at 18–19); FED. TRADE. COMM’N (Jan. 2017),
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/ftcs-merger-remedies-2006-2012report-bureaus-competition-economics/p143100_ftc_merger_remedies_20062012.pdf.
172. See U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 940 (1998) (explaining that
“the [Antitrust Division] became concerned that this practice violated [the
Consent Decree] by effectively conditioning the license for Windows 95 on the
license for IE 4.0, creating (in its view) what antitrust law terms a ‘tie-in’
between the operating system and the browser”).
173. See id. (prohibiting Microsoft from placing a condition on the license
that the licensee would have to “also license and preinstall any Microsoft
Internet browser software [] including Internet Explorer 3.0, 4.0, or any
successor versions thereof”).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 950; see also id. at 953 (stating “there is no reason to
allow the preliminary injunction to remain in effect pending a proper hearing”).
176. Id.
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While the Internet Explorer suit was pending, the Antitrust
Division and 20 state attorneys general sued Microsoft.177
Specifically, the suit “charged Microsoft with engaging in
anticompetitive and exclusionary practices designed to maintain its
monopoly.” These practices related to a competing browser called
Netscape.178 Eventually, in 2001, the Court reached its decision in
U.S. v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft III), finally resolving the
investigation that began in 1990.179
Initially, the state attorneys general were concerned, believing
that the Antitrust Division would push for conduct remedies
only.”180 Once they heard how stringent the Antitrust Division’s
proposals were, they signed on, and the District Court approved.181
The Court determined that Microsoft had made the “deliberate and
purposeful choice to quell incipient competition.”182 It ultimately
found that Microsoft violated the Sherman Act.183 The District
Court’s final judgment was severe, requiring Microsoft to
“separate[e] the Operating Systems Business from the Applications
Business.”184 In other words, Microsoft had to structurally separate
into two companies, one focused exclusively on the Windows
operating system and the other focused on the company’s other
projects.185 The assistant attorney general for the Antitrust Division
remarked: “This opinion will . . . set the ground rules for
enforcement in the Information Age.”186 Indeed, this decision
177. See generally U.S. v. Microsoft: Timeline, WIRED (Nov. 4, 2002), www.wi
red.com/2002/11/u-s-v-microsoft-timeline/ (tracking the timeframe of the action
against Microsoft, the new action was filled before the previous case was
resolved).
178. Justice Department Files Antitrust Suit Against Microsoft For
Unlawfully Monopolizing Computer Software Markets, DEP’T JUSTICE (May 18,
1998), www.justice. gov/archive/atr/public/press_releases/1998/1764.htm.
179. Microsoft III, supra note 145, at 34.
180. See John Heilemann, The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing But The
Truth, WIRED (Nov. 1, 2000, 12:00 PM), www.wired.com/2000/11/microsoft-7/
(remarking that “the states believed the Justice Department would never ask
for a breakup”).
181. Id.; see also U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 62 (D.D.C. 2000)
(finding that a “structural remedy has become imperative: Microsoft as it is
presently organized and led is unwilling to accept the notion that it broke the
law or accede to an order amending its conduct”).
182. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 51 (D.D.C. 2000); see also id.
at 50 (concluding that “it is nevertheless clear that licensees, including
consumers, are forced to take, and pay for, the entire package of software and
that any value to be ascribed to Internet Explorer is built into this single price”).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 53.
185. See id. at 64 (determining that “[n]ot later than four months after entry
of this Final Judgment, Microsoft shall submit to the Court and the [Antitrust
Division] a proposed plan of divestiture”).
186. Jube Shiver Jr. & Michael A. Hiltzik, Microsoft Violated Federal
Antitrust Laws, Judge Rules, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2000), www.lati
mes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-apr-04-mn-15707-story.html.
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indicated that the Antitrust Division had learned from the timeconsuming actions taken against AT&T and IBM.187 The effects on
Microsoft were significant, as Bill Gates left his role as chief
executive of Microsoft – an internal shift attributed to the
enforcement action.188
However, Microsoft never split into two companies.189 The D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals determined that Microsoft still had
violated the Sherman Act for some practices, but did not require it
to break up.190 The D.C. Circuit found that Microsoft’s restriction
forbidding manufactures from installing other programs still
violated the Sherman Act as it protected Microsoft’s monopoly.191
Where the D.C. Circuit differed was in its determination that
Microsoft was not liable for the integration of Internet Explorer into
Windows.192 The D.C. Circuit also differed from the district court in
finding that the Antitrust Division failed to prove that Microsoft
had attempted to monopolize the market.193 When examining the
appropriate remedies, the D.C. Circuit noted that “divestiture is a
remedy that is imposed only with great caution.”194 While
“divestiture is a common form of relief in successful antitrust
prosecutions,” the remedy’s appropriateness was an aspect for the
district court to reconsider.195 Divestiture itself is usually used as a
remedy when there is a problem with overwhelming corporate
control in Sherman Act violations.196 It is an appropriate remedy
when “asset or stock acquisitions violate the antitrust laws,” and

187. TIME Staff, "Microsoft Enjoys Monopoly Power . . . ", TIME (Nov. 15,
1999), www.content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2054223,00.html.
188. David Bank, Gates Steps Aside as Microsoft's CEO; Ballmer to Take
Over Daily Operations, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 14, 2000), www.wsj.com
/articles/SB947799478575341462.
189. See U.S. v. Microsoft: Timeline, supra note 177 (documenting the
timeline of the Antitrust Divisions’ actions against Microsoft, and that the
Antitrust Division no longer sought Microsoft to be broken up).
190. Alex Fitzpatrick, A Judge Ordered Microsoft to Split. Here's Why It's
Still a Single Company, TIME (Nov. 5, 2014), www.time.com/3553242/microsoftmonopoly/.
191. Microsoft III, supra note 145, at 64 (“Accordingly, we affirm the District
Court's decision holding that Microsoft's exclusive contracts . . . are exclusionary
devices, in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act”).
192. See id. (deciding that “all the OEM license restrictions at issue
represent uses of Microsoft's market power to protect its monopoly, unredeemed
by any legitimate justification”).
193. Id. at 67 “The plaintiff bears the burden not only of rebutting a
proffered justification but also of demonstrating that the anticompetitive effect
of the challenged action outweighs. Id. The government did not prove or
demonstrate that the act was anticompetitive rather than just a design change
in the marketplace. Id.
194. Id. at 84.
195. Id. at 80.
196. Id. (citing U.S. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. at 329).
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may not be appropriate when the company has naturally grown .197
Microsoft naturally became a large company, instead of acquiring
large competitors, so it can be harder to divide as there are fewer
internal divisions.198 As a final result, the D.C. Circuit found that
the District Judge communicated with the press and made
statements indicating that he was not impartial.199 The remedy
order was vacated, and the District Judge was disqualified for the
rest of the proceedings.200
Following that, the Antitrust Division and Microsoft entered
an agreed-upon consent decree, but it was far less severe than what
the Antitrust Division initially desired.201 Instead of forcing a split
into two companies, the decree forced Microsoft to allow other
companies to create third party software on Windows.202 The decree
required Microsoft to ensure that their platform was open to other
software users.203 Additionally, the company was “required to end
retaliation against computer makers who use non-Microsoft
software.”204
Netscape, the competing browser, was dominating the browser
market before the integration of Internet Explorer, holding 90
percent of the market share.205 Netscape went from a startup in late
1994 to a 10 billion dollar company when acquired by AOL in
1999.206 After the integration into Windows, Netscape slowly fell as

197. Id. (citing Ford Motor Co. v. U.S., 405 U.S. 562, 573 (1972)).
198. See id. at 106 (stating that dividing a merged company is possible even
after some time because “identifiable entities preexisted to create a template for
such division as the court might later decree”); see also U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (finding that “[a] corporation,
designed to operate effectively as a single entity, cannot readily be dismembered
of parts of its various operations without a marked loss of efficiency”).
199. Id. at 107 (by talking to reporters for an impending case, his “violations
were deliberate, repeated, egregious, and flagrant”).
200. Id. at 117 (the District Judge was disqualified “retroactive only to the
imposition of the remedy,” so on remand Microsoft III was before a different
judge to determine the remedy, not to rehear the entire case).
201. See generally U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002)
(discussing the scope of the consent decree’s provisions, which was far less than
the breakup that the Antitrust Division initially sought).
202. Diane Bartz, Microsoft Antitrust Decree Ends, Google Eyed, REUTERS
(May 12, 2011), www.reuters.com/article/us-microsoft-antitrust-idUSTRE74B4
R520110512.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Kurt Mackie, The Microsoft Consent Decree Expires, VISUAL STUDIO
MAG.
(May
13,
2011),
www.visualstudiomagazine.com/articles/2011/05/13/wnews_consent-decreeexpires.aspx; see also Nate Mook, Firefox Usage Passes 15 Percent in US,
BETANEWS (Jul. 10, 2006), www.betanews.com/2006/07/10/firefox-usagepasses-15-percent-in-us/.
206. Sean Cooper, Whatever Happened to Netscape?, ENGADGET (May 10,
2014), www.engadget.com/2014/05/10/history-of-netscape/.
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the browser of choice to less than one percent of the marketplace.207
It stopped competing in the market altogether in 2008.208
Afterwards, Netscape itself faded away as an organization,
subsumed into AOL.209 Eventually, Microsoft even bought the
patents that Netscape was built on.210
Microsoft relatively got off easy from the enforcement action
taken by the Antitrust Division, while still being restrained in some
key areas.211 Generally, while Microsoft was not an unchecked
giant, the conduct remedies imposed were effective in constraining
future anticompetitive practices.212 The suit itself and the remedies
made Microsoft more cautious, leading other firms like Google and
Amazon to grow.213 Microsoft used its position to protect their free
product, Internet Explorer, by restricting other manufactures from
installing competing browsers.214 The conduct restrictions allowed
other competitors to enter and grow, while Microsoft focused on
making products that worked on other platforms, not just
Windows.215 Microsoft III helped show that the enforcement action
itself is enough to change companies conduct, and that courts may
be amendable to more stringent remedies.216

B. Benefits and Detractions of Antitrust Remedies
When looking at the two broad types of remedies, each have

207. Mackie, supra note 205.
208. Id.
209. W. Joseph Campbell, The '90s Startup That Terrified Microsoft and Got
Americans to Go Online, WIRED (Jan. 27, 2015), www.wired.com/2015/01/90sstartup-terrified-microsoft-got-americans-go-online/.
210. Matt Blitz, Later, Navigator: How Netscape Won and Then Lost the
World Wide Web, POPULAR MECHANICS (Apr. 4, 2019), www.popularmech
anics.com/culture/web/a27033147/netscape-navigator-history/.
211. Cf., David S. Evans, U.S. v. Microsoft, Did Consumers Win?, NAT’L
BUREAU ECON. RES. (determining that “Microsoft is prone to anticompetitive . .
. then one must believe that the remedy is likely to prevent future at least some
violations that might harm consumers”).
212. Id.
213. Richard Blumenthal & Tim Wu, What the Microsoft Antitrust Case
Taught Us, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/05/18/opinion/
microsoft-antitrust-case.html.
214. Id., see also U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 64 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(remarking that Microsoft prevented manufacturers from adding other products
to Windows through their licensing agreements).
215. See Brian Feldman, U.S. v. Microsoft Proved That Antitrust Can Keep
Tech Power in Check, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Dec. 12, 2017), www.nymag.com/intellig
encer/2017/12/u-s-v-microsoft-proved-that-antitrust-can-check-techpower.html (answering the question of whether or not “the lawsuit play[ed] a
significant role in opening up the field for new or small tech companies like
Google and Apple? — seems to have a clear answer: Yes”).
216 See id. (finding that the enforcement action in the end allowed for more
competition).
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their own key benefits and detractions. They fall into two broad
categories: structural remedies and conduct remedies.217 When
dealing with merger cases, there is a preference towards structural
remedies because the company itself can organize a clean break
without much government involvement.218 When dealing with
mergers, a conduct remedy is considered to be more appropriate
when it can help the structural solution.219 Historically, when larger
companies purchased startups or other small companies, the
purchase would sometimes lead the company into a new market.220
Other times the purchases would augment a preexisting product or
service to gain a larger competitive advantage.221 The first situation
described is closer to a vertical merger – buying a company to enter
a new market place.222 The second situation is an example of a
horizontal merger, where one buys a company to gain market share
and technology.223
1. Structural Remedies
Structural remedies are considered to be relatively easy to
administer and are the remedy of choice to preserve competition.224
Structural remedies intend to protect competition by requiring the
sale or divestiture of part of a company.225
The primary concern is to make sure that each separated part
is equally viable.226 This can be a problem, however, if there is not
a complete break between the two parts of the company: A forced
relationship can make the new firm or division of another company
too tied to the initial company’s decisions.227 This relationship can
be even more impactful if the original company needs to ensure that
the new company is viable.228 The new firm is still heavily reliant

217. DOJ Antitrust Policy 2011, supra note 137, at 7.
218. Id.
219. See id. (preventing the merger would “sacrifice significant efficiencies
and a structural remedy would similarly eliminate such efficiencies or is simply
infeasible”).
220. Schonefeld, supra note 11.
221. Weinberger, supra note 16.
222. MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 123, at 7.
223. Id.
224. Id. (citing U.S. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. at 331);
California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 280-81 (1990)) (“[I]n
Government actions divestiture is the preferred remedy for an illegal merger or
acquisition”).
225. DOJ Antitrust Policy 2004, supra note 119, at 7 (“structural remedies
generally will involve the sale of physical assets by merging firms”).
226. Id. at 12.
227. MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 123, at 56.
228. See id. at 57 (finding that “[t]he exact nature of any transition services
agreement depends on the specific needs of the divestiture buyer in regards to
competing with the divestiture package”).
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on the decisions of the former parent, and does not have as much
independence to pursue other acts.229 Limiting the duration of the
agreement helps lower the risk of improper coordination but could
harm the viability of the new firm if it is not long enough.230
2. Conduct Remedies
Conduct remedies, as the name suggests, restrict the firm’s
conduct, rather than changing the structure of the firm.231
Currently, these remedies are disfavored, instead with the
enforcement agencies preferring structural remedies, such as
divestiture of a business unit.232 Conduct remedies, however, are
still used in current policy, as these remedies can be incorporated
into the structural remedy that the enforcement agency creates.233
Conduct remedies focus on monitoring the firm’s actions
through injunctive provisions, with the enforcement agencies
making sure there are no violations of these provisions.234 These
conduct remedies effect different things, focusing on restricting one
specific aspect of a company’s operation.235 A firewall provision, for
example, would restrict the flow of information between the
acquired business unit and the rest of the company.236 While this
provision may minimize the risk of disadvantaging rivals with new
information, it reduces the efficiency of the parent company.237 If
the acquisition of the company was completed in order to buy
knowledge or a skill set for the parent company, a firewall provision
could prevent that from happening, making the purchase
potentially useless.238
A prior notice or approval provision requires that a company
notify the enforcement agency before future purchases or obtain

229. Id.
230. Id. at 56.
231. Id. at 58.
232. Makan Delrahim, It Takes Two: Modernizing the Merger Review
Process, Remarks at the 2018 Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium, DEP’T
JUSTICE (Sept. 25, 2018), www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-gen
eral-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-2018-global-antitrust (discussing how
the 2004 standards are preferred and currently in use by the Antitrust
Division).
233. MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 123 at 58.
234. DOJ Antitrust Policy 2011, supra note 137, at 7.
235. See MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 123, at 60 (“include[es]
internal firewalls, external remedies, hybrid remedies, third-party consents and
approvals, and agency monitoring and reporting requirements”).
236. Id. (citing DOJ Antitrust Policy 2011, supra note 137, at 13-14);
Richard Feinstein, Director, Bureau of Competition, Negotiating Merger
Remedies: Statement of the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade
Commission (Jan. 2012).
237. Id.
238. Id.
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approve of the purchases beforehand.239 Enforcement agencies
utilize this provision in various ways.240
Typically, enforcement agencies usually only require the
companies to notify them if a merger is valued at over 90 million
dollars.241 As such, smaller companies and startups can be
purchased without notification to the agencies based on their size
alone.242 For example, startups in early stages have a median value
of around 29 million dollars – a value well below that which requires
reporting.243 Since these valuations fall below the reporting
requirements, the enforcement agency may not be aware of these
purchases.244 Additionally, the market concentration from these
purchases
may
fall
below
the
Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index measure for initial scrutiny.245
Mandatory licensing programs can help ensure that certain
technology or intellectual property is available to others to prevent
a monopoly of the technology.246 Access is useful to allow for
continued research and development, but can have the downside of
giving away a key part of the business.247 Fair dealing are cut and
dry, ensuring that the company will not attempt to disadvantage
others.248 Restricting how a company can act towards others as in
Microsoft III ensures that the markets are open and everyone would

239. Id.
240. C.f., Fed. Trade Comm’n, Frequently Asked Questions About Merger
Consent Order Provisions, www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guideantitrust-laws/mergers/merger-faq with MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note
123, at 60 (citing Wm Randolph Smith & Megan Louise Wolf, Prior Notice: How
a Merger Remedy Can Be Anticompetitive, BNA (Mar. 8, 2013), www.antitrust
.bna.com/atrc/7033/split_display.adp?fedfid=29966136&vname=atrcnotallissue
s&wsn=499977000&searchid=31260640&doctypeid=1&type=oascore4news&m
ode=doc&split=0&scm=7033&pg=0) (comparing the FTC use of the provision
depending on the market versus the Antitrust Division’s changing practices,
utilizing them more frequently).
241. FED. TRADE. COMM’N, Merger Review, www.ftc.gov/news-events/mediaresources/mergers-and-competition/merger-review (last accessed Jan. 4, 2020).
242. E.g., id. (noting that any merger over the notification threshold should
be reported for review, allowing for mergers below that notification to not be
reported).
243. Alex Frederick, Cameron Stanfill, & Van Le, VC Valuation 1H 2019,
PITCHBOOK (2019).
244. See Merger Review, supra note 241 (noting there is only a requirement
to report if the merger is over the notification threshold, so mergers less than
that amount may not be noticed).
245. See Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, DEP’T JUSTICE www.justice.gov/atr
/herfindahl-hirschman-index (last visited on Nov. 24, 2019) (stating that
agencies generally look for a concentration shift of 100-200 points in the market,
depending on the concentration in that market).
246. See MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 123, at 60 (citing DOJ
Antitrust Policy 2011, supra note 137, at 13-14).
247. Id.
248. Id.
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be treated equally.249
However, the company may not want to deal with a competitor
by having to treat them the same as a company who does not
compete with them. Anti-retaliation provisions can mitigate the
damage from restricting competition, but depending on the scope,
can be less applicable.250 These provisions are best suited to prevent
retaliation against consumers, rather than retaliation against a
firm.251 As shown by Microsoft III, conduct remedies can work to
restrain some anticompetitive practices effectively but do not cover
modern problems.

C. New Possibilities for Remedies
Recently, there has been some discussion from the FTC in how
to regulate tech companies, as “there is no safe harbor for
eliminating future competitors.”252 Section 7 of the Clayton Act
prevents companies from acquiring another company if the “the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition.”253 It also limits the restriction of commerce, or any
acquisition that “tend[s] to create a monopoly.”254 In two actions
focusing on restricting competition or future harm, the FTC
intervened, leading to the quick resolutions.255 The FTC intervened
because one firm could become a greater threat in the future, as
only one firm would remain in the market.256 While no remedies
were enforced, the threat of intervention by the FTC to protect
future competition was enough to resolve the potential
anticompetitive acts.257

IV. PROPOSAL
First, the FTC and the Antitrust Division should incorporate
structural remedy provisions into their conduct remedies when
enforcing mergers against larger, established companies.
Specifically, the FTC and the Antitrust Division should learn from
249. Microsoft III, supra note 145.
250. MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 123, at 62.
251. Id. (citing DOJ Antitrust Policy 2011, supra note 137, at 18).
252. See D. Bruce Hoffman, Director, Bureau of Competition, Antitrust in
the Digital Economy: A Snapshot of FTC Issues, Remarks at GCR Live Antitrust
in the Digital Economy (May 22, 2019) (discussing possibility of enforcement by
the FTC under Section 7 of Clayton Act, due to effect on future competition).
253. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2020).
254. Id.
255. See Hoffman, supra note 252 (determining that “[t]he complaint alleged
harm to current competition, but focused even more sharply on harm to future,
or nascent competition”).
256. Id.
257. Id.
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the Antitrust Division’s successes and failures against Microsoft in
fashioning these remedies. Finally, these enforcement agencies
should utilize Section 7 of the Clayton Act to bring actions against
certain acquisitions of smaller companies by larger, institutional
companies.

A. Solutions Through Prior Notification
Stronger conduct remedies can provide both a solution and a
deterrence to large companies purchasing small or startup
companies. While structural remedies provide a clean break
between companies previously connected, conduct remedies are
better tailored to vertical merger issues.258 Incorporating both
structural and conduct remedies into a unified approach would
provide a more comprehensive remedy for prohibiting
anticompetitive actions.259 Enforcement agencies should specifically
enter a prior notification provision into consent decrees.
Often companies purchase startups or other small companies
to lead the company into a new market, which would be a case of
expanding the business vertically.260 Other times the purchases
may give the company a competitive advantage, providing a
horizontal merger.261 The main problem for antitrust enforcement
in any merger situation is the size of the company being bought. As
the enforcement agencies usually only require merger notifications
if the company is valued at over 90 million, smaller companies are
not on the radar.262 Most startups do not have a large market
valuation, so purchases of these companies would not fall under the
90 million reporting requirement.263 Additionally, the market
concentration from these purchases may fall below the HerfindahlHirschman Index measure for initial scrutiny.264 The challenge is
fashioning a remedy that addresses smaller changes that may not
affect the market immediately but have potential future
anticompetitive effects.
Structural remedies alone would not address this problem, as
the forced divesture of a business unit would not be appropriate to
resolve anticompetitive concerns here.265 If the purchase is to
improve a business unit or gain technology for the company, it may
258. DOJ Antitrust Policy 2011, supra note 137, at 1-2.
259. Id.
260. See MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE supra note 123, at 7.
261. Id.
262. Merger Review, supra note 241.
263. See Alex Frederick, Cameron Stanfill, Van Le, VC Valuation 1H 2019,
PITCHBOOK (2019) (determining that early stage startups typically have a
median value around 29 million).
264. See Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, supra note 245 (noting that agencies
look for a concentration shift in an already concentrated market).
265. MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 123, at 52.
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be effective to block the purchase. However, intervening and
blocking a purchase every time is inefficient. That is where conduct
remedies come into play. The enforcement agencies should expand
their use of prior notification and approval provisions to prevent
other purchases in the same market.266 This remedy has been
disfavored by the FTC, which has instead preferred the system of
notification based on dollar valuation.267 Because that system
allows for smaller anticompetitive acts, it must be supplemented
with a prior notification and approval provision.268
Combining prior notification and approval provisions can help
enforcement agencies track when a previously offending large
company purchases a smaller company.269 It would also provide a
deterrence to companies, providing another avenue and a middle
ground solution not available before.270 The prior notification
provision would still allow companies to attempt acquisitions for
their best interest. The provision allows the enforcement agency to
determine if any acquisition would violate the consent decree, which
covers smaller companies as well as larger ones. Any potentially
anticompetitive purchase of a smaller company requiring
notification helps deter the truly anticompetitive purchases but
would still allow the purchases in the event of a clear business
rational. Having a middle ground gives an option for the
enforcement agencies without needing to threaten dissolution of the
entire company.271

B. Learning from U.S. v. Microsoft Corp.
While U.S. v. Microsoft was not a runaway success for the
Antitrust Division, there are some important takeaways that can
shape future enforcement policy. Microsoft was not broken up, but
it was effectively restricted by the enforcement action by the threat
of being broken up.272 Bill Gates, the former Microsoft CEO, argues
that Microsoft was not able to dominate the mobile phone market

266. See generally Halliburton and Baker Hughes Abandon Merger After
Department of Justice Sued to Block Deal, DEP’T JUSTICE (May 1, 2016),
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/halliburton-and-baker-hughes-abandon-merger-afterdepartment-justice-sued-block-deal (showing how enforcement agencies have
the authority to threaten to block mergers, and the authority and investigation
were enough to end the merger).
267. MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 123, at 64.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Stephen Calkins, Corporate Compliance and the Antitrust Agencies’ BiModal Penalties, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 139 (1997).
271. See id. at 138 (noting that enforcement actions did not survive a court
challenge because of the severity of the remedies but may have survived if there
was a lesser remedy available).
272. Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 62.
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as a direct result of the government’s antitrust case because it could
not take action before other companies could develop and
compete.273 This is especially clear today, as Apple and Google are
the two major companies in the mobile phone software marketplace,
with Microsoft dropping support for their own operating system in
2016.274 Without the action by the Antitrust Division, Microsoft
could have moved in and dominated the mobile operating system
market, as they did in the desktop market.275
As companies may be more cautious after an enforcement
action, having a prior notification provision in the final consent
decree can provide a combined deterrence. Entering a decree
requiring notification of any purchase of another company in a
related marketplace after entering the market puts the company on
notice. The company then knows that while they have now entered
a new marketplace, they cannot dominate it by buying the entire
market.

C. How to Get a Prior Notification Provision
There is still one hurdle to getting a prior notification provision
in an antitrust decree, which is the initial enforcement action itself.
When the purchased company is valued at less than 90 million
dollars, a prior notification provision would not apply. Without that
notice, the enforcement agency would have no reason to begin an
investigation.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides a solution.276 Instead of
the current policy, enforcement agencies should be actively
investigating. This section provides them with the authority to
bring an action when an acquisition may substantially lessen
competition.277 All that they need to do next is actually begin
investigating. This provides an avenue to getting a prior notification
and consent decree, and with the appropriate backing, can put
pressure on companies to agree.278 For example, while it took eight

273. Tom Warren, Bill Gates Thinks Windows Mobile Would Have Beaten
Android Without Microsoft’s Antitrust Woes, VERGE (Nov. 6, 2019), www.thev
erge.com/2019/11/6/20952370/bill-gates-windows-mobile-android-competitioncomments-microsoft-antitrust.
274. Tom Warren, Microsoft to End Windows 10 Mobile Updates and
Support in December, VERGE (Jan. 18, 2019), www.theverge.com/2019/1/18/18
188054/microsoft-windows-phone-windows-10-mobile-end-of-support-updates.
275. See Matt Binder, Windows 10 is Now the Most Popular Desktop
Operating
System
in
the
World,
MASHABLE
(Jan.
2,
2019),
www.mashable.com/article/microsoft-windows-10-most-popular-os-in-theworld/ (stating that Windows 10 has over a 39 percent share of desktop
operating systems, Windows 7 has less than a 37 percent share).
276. 15 U.S.C. §§ 14-18 (2020).
277. Hoffman, supra note 252.
278. Id.
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years, AT&T eventually agreed to break up its monopoly after
feeling the pressure of an investigation.279 By AT&T agreeing to the
decree, the Antitrust Division ended a large monopoly without
forcing its breakup through the courts. By putting pressure on
AT&T, they were able to get AT&T to agree to dissolve its own
monopoly.
However, D. Bruce Hoffman, the Director of the Bureau of
Competition, has discussed some potential problems with this type
of enforcement: The enforcement agencies have had almost 5,000
filings annually to review for potential anticompetitive activity,
wasting departmental resources for other serious investigations.280
Changing the value notification requirement in any way was meant
to resolve this resource issue.281 Nonetheless, moving away from the
reliance on the value notification as the primary way of notifications
of acquisitions of new competitors can prevent anticompetitive
actions.
In order to have a decree to enforce, there needs to be a
substantive anticompetitive act that the enforcement agency can
investigate and bring an action. Once the action begins, the decree
can be tailored to the specific market that the company is trying to
purchase its way into. Beginning an investigation from a smaller
transaction issue can allow for a decree, which requires a prior
notification provision.282 Removing the cap can provide enough
starting groundwork for enforcement and getting a decree
entered.283 From there, future purchases can be covered and
investigated. If Apple were to continue to buy 20-25 companies
every six months, a prior notification provision would alert the
enforcement agencies directly.284 This would center the
investigations on the specific actors instead of sifting through
thousands of reports, focusing on the right wording of the provision.
For a decree entered for anticompetitive acts in an unrelated
market, the decree should be worded for notification for all
unrelated purchases. This would cover purchases of smaller,
unrelated companies, allowing the enforcement agencies to
investigate and determine if there was an anticompetitive act.
Ultimately, removing the current notification procedure can allow
for more enforcement actions and open an avenue for a decree to be
entered preventing anticompetitive purchases.

279. U.S. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 139-41 (D.D.C.
1982).
280. Hoffman, supra note 252.
281. Id.
282. See id. (referencing the problems with detection beforehand, and that
setting a requirement for notice solved some issues with being notified of
potential anticompetitive purchases).
283. Id.
284. Feiner, supra note 22.
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V. CONCLUSION
Antitrust enforcement has evolved over time, with the targets
of both consumers and enforcement agencies shifting. First, the
focus was on the monopolies of the gilded age. Then, it shifted in the
mid-century to corporations like AT&T and IBM. Today, the focus
is on larger companies, usually in the technology sector, such as
Apple, Google, and Amazon. Their reach is far and extends into
markets well beyond what initially made them popular. Many of
these successes came from the purchases of smaller companies.
Acquiring small companies early allowed for Siri and Alexa to
thrive.285 In augmenting their products and expanding their
company, they may have prevented others from thriving, but there
has been little enforcement or investigation. Enforcement agencies
have a wide variety of remedies available, from divestment, to
mandatory licensing, to fair dealing, to prohibiting restrictive
contracts.286
However, the enforcement agencies have a tool that could be
effective at restricting anticompetitive purchases of small
companies: the prior notification provision. While other remedies
change how companies act, the prior notification provision gives
enforcement agencies the ability to know and address
anticompetitive actions at an early stage. Prior notification or
approval provisions give the enforcement agencies the notice that
they need to determine if these actions are anticompetitive.287
Enforcement agencies should become more proactive by utilizing
their authority under Section 7 and using prior notification
provisions to investigate and determine if anticompetitive acts are
ongoing. Otherwise, companies like Apple, Google, and Amazon
may continue to dominate new markets by buying the market itself.
The problem that the FTC faces of needing to ask about these
mergers could have been resolved if a notification provision was in
place to notify enforcement agencies about these purchases.288
Instead of asking, enforcement agencies can know earlier and be
proactive in investigating and enforcing, instead of reacting to
purchases that were concluded long ago.289

285. See Schonefeld, supra note 11 (describing how purchasing these smaller
startups led them to integrating and creating popular products).
286. MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 123, at 49-69.
287. Id. at 64.
288. See Bartz and Bose, supra note 29 (discussing that the FTC has begun
investigating mergers that were too small to report).
289. Id.

